Shapley Q-value: A Local Reward Approach to Solve Global Reward Games by Wang, Jianhong et al.
Shapley Q-value: A Local Reward Approach to Solve Global Reward Games
Jianhong Wang12∗, Yuan Zhang3∗, Tae-Kyun Kim2, Yunjie Gu1
1 Control and Power Research Group, Imperial College London, UK
2 Imperial Computer Vision and Learning Lab, Imperial College London, UK
3 Laiye Network Technology Co.Ltd., China
Abstract
Cooperative game is a critical research area in the multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL). Global reward game is a
subclass of cooperative games, where all agents aim to max-
imize the global reward. Credit assignment is an important
problem studied in the global reward game. Most of previous
works stood by the view of non-cooperative-game theoretical
framework with the shared reward approach, i.e., each agent
being assigned a shared global reward directly. This, however,
may give each agent an inaccurate reward on its contribu-
tion to the group, which could cause inefficient learning. To
deal with this problem, we i) introduce a cooperative-game
theoretical framework called extended convex game (ECG)
that is a superset of global reward game, and ii) propose a
local reward approach called Shapley Q-value. Shapley Q-
value is able to distribute the global reward, reflecting each
agent’s own contribution in contrast to the shared reward
approach. Moreover, we derive an MARL algorithm called
Shapley Q-value deep deterministic policy gradient (SQD-
DPG), using Shapley Q-value as the critic for each agent.
We evaluate SQDDPG on Cooperative Navigation, Prey-and-
Predator and Traffic Junction, compared with the state-of-the-
art algorithms, e.g., MADDPG, COMA, Independent DDPG
and Independent A2C. In the experiments, SQDDPG shows a
significant improvement on the convergence rate. Finally, we
plot Shapley Q-value and validate the property of fair credit
assignment.
1 Introduction
Cooperative game is a critical research area in multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL). Many real-life tasks can
be modeled as cooperative games, e.g., the coordination of
autonomous vehicles (Keviczky et al. 2007), autonomous
distributed logistics (Schuldt 2012) and search-and-rescue
robots (Koes, Nourbakhsh, and Sycara 2006; Ramchurn et
al. 2010). Global reward game (Chang, Ho, and Kaelbling
2004) is a subclass of cooperative games where agents aim
to maximize the global reward. In this game, credit assign-
ment is an important problem, which targets on finding a
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method to distribute the global reward. There are two cat-
egories of approaches to solve out this problem, namely
shared reward approach (also known as shared reward game
or fully cooperative game) (Sukhbaatar, szlam, and Fergus
2016; Omidshafiei et al. 2018; Kim et al. 2019) and local re-
ward approach (Panait and Luke 2005). The shared reward
approach directly assigns the global reward to all agents.
The local reward approach, on the other hand, distributes the
global reward according to each agent’s contribution, and
turns out to have superior performances in many tasks (Fo-
erster et al. 2018; Nguyen, Kumar, and Lau 2018).
Whatever approach is adopted, a remaining open question
is whether there is an underlying theory to explain credit
assignment. Conventionally, a global reward game is built
upon non-cooperative game theory, which primarily aims to
find Nash equilibrium as the stable solution (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994; Basar and Olsder 1999). This formulation
can be extended to a dynamic environment with infinite hori-
zons via stochastic game (Shapley 1953a). However, Nash
equilibrium focuses on the individual reward and has no ex-
plicit incentives for cooperation. As a result, the shared re-
ward function has to be applied to force cooperation, which
could be used as a possible explanation to the shared reward
approach, but not the local reward approach.
In our work, we introduce and investigate the coopera-
tive game theory (or the coalitional game theory) (Chalki-
adakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge 2011) in which local reward
approach becomes rationalized. In cooperative game theory,
the objective is dividing coalitions and binding agreements
among agents who belong to the same coalition. We focus
on convex game (CG) which is a typical game in coopera-
tive game theory featuring the existence of a stable coalition
structure with an efficient payoff distribution scheme (i.e., a
local reward approach) called core. This payoff distribution
is equivalent to the credit assignment, thereby the core ratio-
nalizes and well explains the local reward approach (Peleg
and Sudho¨lter 2007).
Referring to the previous work (Suijs and Borm 1999),
we extend CG to an infinite-horizon scenario, namely ex-
tended CG (ECG). In addition, we show that a global re-
ward game is equivalent to an ECG with the grand coali-
tion and an efficient payoff distribution scheme. Further-
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more, we propose Shapley Q-value, extending Shapley value
(i.e., an efficient payoff distribution scheme) for the credit
assignment in an ECG with the grand coalition. Therefore,
it results in a conclusion that Shapley Q-value is able to
work in a global reward game. Finally, we derive an al-
gorithm called Shapley Q-value deep deterministic policy
gradient (SQDDPG) according to the actor-critic framework
(Konda and Tsitsiklis 2000) to learn decentralized policies
with centralized critics (i.e., Shapley Q-values). SQDDPG
is evaluated on the environments such as Cooperative Nav-
igation, Prey-and-Predator (Lowe et al. 2017), and Traffic
Junction (Sukhbaatar, szlam, and Fergus 2016), compared
with the state-of-the-art baselines, e.g., MADDPG (Lowe et
al. 2017), COMA (Foerster et al. 2018), Independent DDPG
(Lillicrap et al. 2015) and Independent A2C (Sutton and
Barto 2018).
2 Related Work
Multi-agent Learning Multi-agent learning refers to a
category of methods that tackle the games with multiple
agents such as cooperative games. Among these methods,
we only focus on using reinforcement learning to deal with
a cooperative game, which is called multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning (MARL). Incredible progresses have recently
been made on MARL. Some researchers (Sukhbaatar, szlam,
and Fergus 2016; Kim et al. 2019; Das et al. 2018) fo-
cus on distributed executions, which allow communications
among agents. Others (Chang, Ho, and Kaelbling 2004;
Foerster et al. 2018; Nguyen, Kumar, and Lau 2018; Lowe et
al. 2017; Iqbal and Sha 2018) consider decentralized execu-
tions, where no communication is permitted during the exe-
cution. Nevertheless, all of them study on centralized critics,
which means information can be shared on the value func-
tion during training. In our work, we pay our attention to the
decentralized execution and the centralized critic.
Cooperative Game As opposed to competing with oth-
ers, agents in a cooperative game aim to cooperate to solve
a joint task or maximize the global payoff (also known as
the global reward) (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge
2011). Shapley (1953a) proposed a non-cooperative game
theoretical framework called stochastic game, which models
the dynamics of multiple agents in zero-sum game with infi-
nite horizons. Hu and Wellman (1998) introduced a general-
sum stochastic game theoretical framework, which gener-
alises the zero-sum game. To force cooperation under this
framework, potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996)
was applied such that each agent shares the same objec-
tive, namely global reward game (Chang, Ho, and Kael-
bling 2004). In this paper, we use cooperative game the-
ory whereas the existing cooperative game framework are
built under the non-cooperative game theory. Our framework
gives a new view on the global reward game and well ex-
plains the reason why credit assignment is important. We
show that the global reward game is a subclass of our frame-
work if we interpret that the agents in a global reward game
forms a grand coalition (i.e., the group including the whole
agents). Under our framework, it is more rational to use a
local reward approach to distribute the global reward.
Credit Assignment Credit assignment is a significant
problem that has been studied in cooperative games for a
long period. There are two sorts of credit assignment ap-
proaches, i.e., shared reward approach and local reward ap-
proach. The shared reward approach directly assigns each
agent the global reward (Sukhbaatar, szlam, and Fergus
2016; Kim et al. 2019; Das et al. 2018; Lowe et al. 2017).
We show that this is actually equivalent to distributing
the global reward equally to individual agents. The global
reward game with this credit assignment scheme is also
called shared reward game (also known as fully coopera-
tive game) (Panait and Luke 2005). However, Wolpert and
Tumer (2002) claimed that the shared reward approach does
not give each agent the accurate contribution. Thus, it may
not perform well in difficult problems. This motivates the
study on the local reward approach, which can distribute
the global reward to agents according to their contributions.
The existing question is how to quantify the contributions.
To investigate the answer to this question, Chang, Ho, and
Kaelbling (2004) attempted using Kalman filter to infer the
contribution of each agent. Recently, Foerster et al. (2018)
and Nguyen, Kumar, and Lau (2018) modelled the marginal
contributions inspired by the reward difference (Wolpert and
Tumer 2002). Under our proposed framework (i.e., ECG),
we propose a new method called Shapley Q-value to learn
a local reward. This method is extended from the Shapley
value (Shapley 1953b). It is theoretically guaranteed to dis-
tribute the global reward fairly. Although Shapley value can
be regarded as the expectation of the marginal contributions,
it is different from the previous works (Foerster et al. 2018;
Nguyen, Kumar, and Lau 2018): it considers all possible or-
ders of agents to form a grand coalition, which has not been
mentioned in these works.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Convex Game
Convex game (CG) is a typical transferable utility game
in the cooperative game theory. The definitions below
are referred to the textbook (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and
Wooldridge 2011). A CG is formally represented as Γ =
〈N , v〉, where N is the set of agents and v is the value
function to measure the profits earned by a coalition (i.e.,
a group). N itself is called the grand coalition. The value
function v : 2N → R is a mapping from a coalition C ⊆ N
to a real number v(C). In a CG, its value function satisfies
two properties, i.e., 1) v(C ∪ D) ≥ v(C) + v(D),∀C,D ⊂
N , C ∩ D = φ; 2) the coalitions are independent. The solu-
tion of a CG is a tuple (CS, x), where CS = {C1, C2, ..., Cm}
is a coalition structure and x = (xi)i∈N indicates the pay-
off (i.e., the local reward) distributed to each agent, which
satisfies two conditions, i.e., 1) xi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N ; 2) x(C) ≤
v(C),∀C ⊆ CS, where x(C) = ∑i∈C xi. CSN denotes the
set of all possible coalition structures. The core is a stable
solution set of a CG, which can be defined mathematically
as core(Γ) = {(C, x)|x(C) ≥ v(C),∀C ⊆ N}. The core of
a CG ensures a reasonable payoff distribution and inspires
our work on credit assignment in MARL.
3.2 Shapley Value
Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) is one of the most popu-
lar methods to solve the payoff distribution problem for a
grand coalition (Fatima, Wooldridge, and Jennings 2008;
Michalak et al. 2013; Faigle and Kern 1992). Given a co-
operative game Γ = (N , v), for any C ⊆ N\{i} let
δi(C) = v(C ∪ {i})− v(C) be a marginal contribution, then
the Shapley value of each agent i can be written as:
Shi(Γ) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(|N | − |C| − 1)!
|N |! · δi(C). (1)
Literally, Shapley value takes the average of marginal con-
tributions of all possible coalitions, so that it satisfies: 1) ef-
ficiency: x(N ) = v(N ); 2) fairness: if an agent i has no
contribution, then xi = 0; if i-th and j-th agents have the
same contribution, then xi = xj (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and
Wooldridge 2011). As we can see from Eq.1, if we calculate
Shapley value for an agent, we have to consider 2|N |−1 pos-
sible coalitions that the agent could join in to form a grand
coalition, which causes the computational catastrophe. To
mitigate this issue, we propose an approximation in the sce-
narios with infinite horizons called approximate Shapley Q-
value which is introduced in the next section.
3.3 Multi-agent Actor-Critic
Different from the value based method, i.e., Q-learning
(Watkins and Dayan 1992), policy gradient (Williams
1992) directly learns the policy by maximizing J(θ) =
Es∼ρpi,a∼piθ [r(s, a)], where r(s, a) is the reward of an ar-
bitrary state-action pair. Since the gradient of J(θ) w.r.t. θ
cannot be directly calculated, policy gradient theorem (Sut-
ton and Barto 2018) is used to approximate the gradient
such that ∇θJ(θ) = Es∼ρpi,a∼piθ [Qpi(s, a)∇θ log piθ(a|s)].
In the actor-critic framework (Konda and Tsitsiklis 2000)
(that is derived from the policy gradient theorem), piθ(a|s)
is called actor and Qpi(s, a) is called critic. Addition-
ally, Qpi(s, a) = Epi[
∑∞
t=1 γ
t−1r(st, at)|s1 = s, a1 = a].
Extending to the multi-agent scenarios, the gradient
of each agent i can be represented as ∇θiJ(θi) =
Es∼ρpi,a∼piθ [Qpii (s, ai)∇θi log piiθi(ai|s)]. Qpii (s, ai) can be
regarded as the estimation of the contribution of each agent
i. If the deterministic policy (Silver et al. 2014) needs
to be learned in MARL problems, we can reformulate
the approximate gradient of each agent as ∇θiJ(θi) =
Es∼ρµ [∇θiµiθi(s)∇aiQµi (s, ai)|ai=µiθi (s)]. In this work, we
applies this formulation to learn the deterministic policy for
each agent.
4 Our Work
In this section, we (i) extend convex game (CG) with the in-
finite horizons and decisions, namely extended convex game
(ECG) and show that a global reward game is equivalent to
an ECG with the grand coalition and an efficient distribu-
tion scheme, (ii) show that the shared reward approach is an
efficient distribution scheme in an ECG with the grand coali-
tion, (iii) propose Shapley Q-value by extending and approx-
imating Shapley value to distribute the credits in a global re-
ward game, because it can accelerate the convergence rate
compared with shared reward approach, and (iv) derive an
MARL algorithm called Shapley Q-value deep determinis-
tic policy gradient (SQDDPG), using the Shapley Q-value
as each agent’s critic.
4.1 Extended Convex Game
Referring to the previous work (Suijs and Borm 1999;
Chalkiadakis and Boutilier 2004), we extend the CG to the
scenarios with infinite horizons and decisions, named as ex-
tended CG (ECG). The set of joint actions of agents is de-
fined as A = ×i∈NAi, where Ai is the feasible action set
for each agent i. S is the set of possible states in the en-
vironment. The dynamics of the environment are defined
as Pr(s′|s, a), where s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A. Inspired by
Nash (1953), we construct the ECG by two stages. In the
stage 1, an oracle arranges the coalition structure and con-
tracts the cooperation agreements, i.e., the credit assigned to
an agent for his optimal long-term contribution if he joins
in some coalition. We assume that this oracle can observe
the whole environment and be familiar with each agent’s
feature. In the stage 2, after joining in the allocated coali-
tion, each agent will further make a decision by pii(ai|s) to
maximize the social value of its coalition, so that the op-
timal social value of each coalition and individual credit
assignment can be achieved, where ai ∈ Ai and s ∈ S.
Mathematically, the optimal value of a coalition C ∈ CS
can be written as maxpiC v
piC (C) = EpiC [
∑∞
t=1 γ
t−1rt(C)];
piC = ×i∈Cpii; rt(C) is the reward gained by coalition C
at each time step. According to the property (1) of the CG
aforementioned, the formula maxpiC∪D v
piC∪D (C ∪ D) ≥
maxpiC v
piC (C) + maxpiD vpiD (D),∀C,D ⊂ N , C ∩ D = φ
holds. In this paper, we denote the joint policy of the whole
agents as pi = ×i∈Npii(ai|s) and assume that each agent can
observe the global state.
Lemma 1 (Shapley 1971; Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and
Wooldridge 2011). 1) Every convex game has a non-empty
core. 2) If a solution (CS, x) is in the core of a characteristic
function game 〈N , v〉 and the payoff distribution scheme is
efficient, then v(CS) ≥ v(CS ′) for every coalition structure
CS ′ ∈ CSN .
Theorem 1. With the efficient payoff distribution scheme,
for an extended convex game (ECG), one solution in the
core must exist with the grand coalition and the objective is
maxpi v
pi({N}), which can lead to the maximal social wel-
fare, i.e., maxpi vpi({N}) ≥ maxpi vpi(CS ′) for every coali-
tion structure CS ′ ∈ CSN .
Proof. This theorem is proved based on Lemma 1. See Ap-
pendix for the complete proof.
Corollary 1. For an extended convex game (ECG) with the
grand coalition, Shapley value must be in the core.
Proof. Since Shapley value must be in the core for a CG
with the grand coalition (Shapley 1971) and ECG still con-
serves the property of CG, this statement holds.
Figure 1: The relationship between the concepts mentioned
in this paper.
As seen from Theorem 1, with an appropriate efficient
payoff distribution scheme, an ECG with the grand coali-
tion is actually equivalent to a global reward game. Both of
them aim to maximize the global value (i.e., the global re-
ward). Here, we assume that the agents in a global reward
game are regarded as the grand coalition. Consequently, the
local reward approach in ECG is feasible in the global re-
ward game.
4.2 Looking into the Shared Reward Approach
by the View of ECG
Shared reward approach assigns each agent the global re-
ward directly in the global reward game (Panait and Luke
2005). Each agent unilaterally maximizes this global reward
to seek its optimal policy such that
max
pii
vpi({N}) = max
pii
Epi[
∞∑
t=1
rt(N ) ], (2)
where rt(N ) is the global reward and pi = ×i∈Npii. If
vpi({N}) is multiplied by a normalizing factor, i.e., 1/|N |,
then the objective of the new optimization problem for each
agent i is equivalent to Eq.2. We can express it mathemati-
cally as
max
pii
vpi({N}) = max
pii
∑
i∈N
xi = max
pii
xi
= max
pii
1
|N | · v
pi({N}).
(3)
Then, the credit assigned to each agent in the shared reward
approach is actually xi = vpi({N})/|N |, and the sum of the
whole agents’ credits is equal to the global reward. It suffices
the condition of efficient payoff distribution scheme. There-
fore, we show that the shared reward approach is an effi-
cient payoff distribution scheme in an ECG with the grand
coalition (i.e., a global reward game). Nevertheless, from the
view of ECG, the shared reward approach is not guaranteed
to find the optimal solution. By Corollary 1 and Theorem 1,
we know that Shapley value has to lie in the core and theo-
retically guarantees the convergence to the maximal global
value. This is one of the reasons why we are interested in
this local reward approach. To clarify the concepts we men-
tioned before, we draw a Venn diagram shown as Fig.1.
4.3 Shapley Q-value
Although the shared reward approach successfully solves
out a global reward game in practice, it has been shown
that local reward approach gives the faster convergence rate
(Balch 1997; Balch 1999). For the two aforementioned rea-
sons, we use the Shapley value (i.e., a local reward approach)
for the credit assignment to each agent. Because vpiC′ (C′)
represents the global reward earned by coalition C′ in an
ECG, we can model it as a Q-value, where s represents the
state and aC′ = (ai)i∈C′ . According to Eq.1, the Shapley
Q-value of each agent can be written as
Φi(C) = QpiC∪{i}(s, aC∪{i})−QpiC (s, aC), (4)
QΦi(s, ai) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(|N | − |C| − 1)!
|N |! · Φi(C). (5)
Approximate Marginal Contribution As seen from
Eq.4, it is difficult and unstable to learn two Q-value func-
tions (where one is for representing the Q-value of C ∪ {i}
and the other is for representing the Q-value of C) to estimate
the marginal contributions (i.e., making the difference be-
tween two Q-values) for different coalitions. To mitigate this
problem, we propose a method called approximate marginal
contribution (AMC) to directly estimate the marginal contri-
bution of each coalition (i.e., Φi(C)).
In cooperative game theory, each agent is assumed to join
in the grand coalition sequentially. |C|!(|N |−|C|−1)!/|N |!
in Eq.1, denoted as Pr(C|N\{i}), is interpreted as that an
agent randomly joins in an existing coalition C (which could
be empty) to form the complete grand coalition with the
subsequent agents (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge
2011). According to this interpretation, we model a func-
tion to approximate the marginal contribution directly such
that
Φˆi(s, aC∪{i}) : S ×AC∪{i} 7→ R, (6)
where S is the state space; C is the ordered coalition that
agent i would like to join in; AC∪{i} = (Aj)j∈C∪{i}, and
the actions are ordered. For example, if the order of a coali-
tion is (0, 2) (where 0 and 2 are two agents), then aC∪{1} =
(a0, a2, a1). By such a formulation, we believe that the prop-
erty of the marginal contribution (i.e., mapping from every
possible combination of coalition C and agent i to a numer-
ical value) can be maintained. Hence, AMC is reasonable
to replace the exact marginal contribution. In practice, we
represent aC∪{i} by the concatenation of each agent’s action
vector. To keep the input size of Φˆi(s, aC∪{i}) constant in
different cases, we fix the actions as the concatenation of
all agents’ actions and mask the actions of irrelevant agents
(i.e., the agents who do not exist in the coalition) with zeros.
Approximate Shapley Q-value Followed by the interpre-
tation above, Shapley Q-value can be rewritten as
QΦi(s, ai) = EC∼Pr(C|N\{i})[ Φi(C) ]. (7)
To enable Eq.7 to be tractable in realization, we can sam-
ple QΦi(s, ai) here. Also, substituting AMC in Eq.6 for the
marginal contribution in Eq.4, we can approximate Shapley
Q-value such that
QΦi(s, ai) ≈ 1
M
M∑
k=1
Φˆi(s, aCk∪{i}), ∀Ck ∼ Pr(C|N\{i}).
(8)
4.4 Shapley Q-value Deep Deterministic Policy
Gradient
In an ECG with the grand coalition, each agent only needs
to maximize its own Shapley value (i.e., QΦi(s, ai)) so that
maxpi v
pi(N ) can be achieved such that
max
pi
vpi(N ) = max
pi
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
max
pii
xi
=
∑
i∈N
max
pii
QΦi(s, ai).
(9)
Therefore, if we can show that maxpii Q
Φi(s, ai) for each
agent i is approached, then we show that the maximal
global value maxpi vpi(N ) is sufficient to be achieved. Now,
the problem transfers to solving maxpii Q
Φi(s, ai) for each
agent i. Aforementioned, a global reward game is identical
to a potential game 1. Additionally, Monderer and Shapley
(1996) showed that in a potential game there exists a pure
Nash equilibrium (i.e., a deterministic optimal policy solu-
tion). For these reasons, we apply deterministic policy gra-
dient (DPG) (Silver et al. 2014) to search out a determin-
istic optimal policy. If we substitute Shapley Q-value for
Qpii (s, ai) in DPG, we can directly write the policy gradient
of each agent i such that
∇θiJ(θi) = Es∼ρµ [∇θiµθi(s)∇aiQΦi(s, ai)|ai=µθi (s)],
(10)
where QΦi(s, ai) is the Shapley Q-value for agent i and
µθi is agent i’s deterministic policy, parameterized by θi. A
global reward is received each time step in a global reward
game. Since the Shapley Q-value of each agent is correlated
to a local reward, we cannot update each QˆΦi(s, ai) directly
by the global reward. However, benefited by the property of
efficiency (see Section 3.2), we can solve it out according to
the minimization problem such that
min
ω1,ω2,...,ω|N|
Est,atN ,rt(N ),st+1 [
1
2
( rt(N )
+ γ
∑
i∈N
QΦi(st+1, at+1i ;ωi)|at+1i =µθi (st+1)
−
∑
i∈N
QΦi(st, ati;ωi) )
2 ],
(11)
where r(N ) is the global reward received from the environ-
ment each time step and QΦi(s, ai;ωi) for each agent i is
parameterized by ωi. Constrained by this objective function,
Shapley Q-value suffices the property of efficiency. Accord-
ingly, the condition of efficient payoff distribution scheme
stated in Theorem 1 is promised. Because Shapley Q-value
takes all of feasible agents’ actions and states as input, our
algorithm actually uses the centralized critic. Nevertheless,
the policies are decentralized in execution.
Silver et al. (2014) showed that DPG has the familiar ma-
chinery of policy gradient. Besides, Sutton and Barto (2018)
emphasized that with a small learning rate, policy gradient
1A potential game is a game where there exists a potential func-
tion (Monderer and Shapley 1996).
algorithm can converge to a local optimum. Consequently,
we can conclude that with a small learning rate, each agent
can find a local maximizer and the global value vpi(N ) con-
verges to a local maximum. The convexity of vpi(N ) is im-
possible to be guaranteed in applications, so the global max-
imum stated in Theorem 1 may not be always fulfilled.
Implementation In implementation, we replace the ex-
act Shapley Q-value by the approximate Shapley Q-value
in Eq.8. Accordingly, the Shapley Q-value here is actually
a linear combination of the approximate marginal contribu-
tions (AMCs) (i.e., Φˆi(s, aC∪{i};ωi)). Thanks to the power-
ful off-policy training strategy and function approximation
on AMCs by the deep neural networks, we use the deep
deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) method (Lillicrap et
al. 2015) for learning policies. Additionally, we apply the
reparameterization technique called Gumbel-Softmax trick
(Jang, Gu, and Poole 2017) to deal with the discrete action
space. Since our algorithm aims to find the optimal policies
by Shapley Q-value and DDPG, we call it Shapley Q-value
deep deterministic policy gradient (SQDDPG). The pseudo
code for the SQDDPG is given in Appendix.
5 Experiments
We evaluate SQDDPG on Cooperative Navigation, Prey-
and-Predator (Lowe et al. 2017) and Traffic Junction
(Sukhbaatar, szlam, and Fergus 2016) 2. In the experiments,
we compare SQDDPG with two Independent algorithms
(with decentralised critics), e.g., Independent DDPG (ID-
DPG) (Lillicrap et al. 2015) and Independent A2C (IA2C)
(Sutton and Barto 2018), and two state-of-the-art methods
with centralised critics, e.g., MADDPG (Lowe et al. 2017)
and COMA (Foerster et al. 2018). In the experiments, to
keep the fairness of comparison, the policy and critic net-
works for all MARL algorithms are parameterized by MLPs.
All models are trained by the Adam optimizer (Kingma and
Ba 2014). The details of experimental setups are given in
Appendix.
5.1 Cooperative Navigation
Environment Settings In this task, there are 3 agents and
3 targets. Each agent aims to move to a target, with no prior
allocations of the targets to each agent. The state of each
agent in this environment includes its current position and
velocity, the displacement to the three targets, and the dis-
placement to other agents. The action space of each agent
is move up, move down, move right, move left and
stay. The global reward of this environment is the nega-
tive sum of the distance between each target and the nearest
agent to it. Besides, if a collision happens, then the global
reward will be reduced by 1.
Results As seen from Fig.2, SQDDPGs with variant sam-
ple sizes (i.e., M in Eq.8) outperform the baselines on the
convergence rate. We believe that if more training episodes
are permitted, the algorithms except for IA2C can achieve
2The code of experiments is available on: https://github.com/
hsvgbkhgbv/SQDDPG
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Figure 2: Mean reward per episode during training in Co-
operative Navigation. SQDDPG(n) indicates SQDDPG with
the sample size (i.e., M in Eq.8) of n. In the rest of experi-
ments, since only SQDDPG with the sample size of 1 is run,
we just use SQDDPG to represent SQDDPG(1).
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Figure 3: Turns to capture the prey per episode during train-
ing in Prey-and-Predator.
the similar performance as that of SQDDPG. Therefore, our
result supports the previous argument that the local reward
approach converges faster than the global reward approach
(Balch 1997; Balch 1999). As the sample size grows, the
approximate Shapley Q-value estimation in Eq.7 could be
more accurate and easier to converge to the optimal value.
This explains the reason why the convergence rate of SQD-
DPG becomes faster when the sample size increases. Since
we show that SQDDPG with the sample size of 1 can finally
obtain nearly the same performance as that of other variants,
we just run it in the rest of experiments to reduce the com-
putational complexity.
5.2 Prey-and-Predator
Environment Settings In this task, we can only control
three predators and the prey is a random agent. The aim of
each predator is coordinating to capture the prey by as less
steps as possible. The state of each predator contains its cur-
rent position and velocity, the respective displacement to the
prey and other predators, and the velocity of the prey. The
action space is the same as that defined in Cooperative Nav-
igation. The global reward is the negative minimal distance
between any predator and the prey. If the prey is caught by
any predator, the global reward will be added by 10 and the
game terminates.
Results As Fig.3 shows, SQDDPG converges fastest with
around 25 turns to capture the prey finally, followed by
MADDPG and IDDPG. To study and understand the credit
assignment, we visualize the Q-values of each MARL algo-
rithm for one randomly selected trajectory of states and ac-
tions from an expert policy. For the convenient visualization,
we normalize the Q-values by min-max normalization (Pa-
tro and Sahu 2015) for each MARL algorithm. We can see
from Fig.4 that the credit assignment of SQDDPG is more
explainable than that of the baselines. Specifically, it is in-
tuitive that the credit assigned to each agent by SQDDPG
is inversely proportional to its distance to the prey. How-
ever, other MARL algorithms do not explicitly show such
a property. To validate this hypothesis, we also evaluate it
quantitatively by Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) on
1000 randomly selected transition samples for the correla-
tion between the credit assignment and the reciprocal of each
predator’s distance to the prey. The value of PCC is greater,
and the inverse proportion is stronger. As Tab.1 shows, SQD-
DPG expresses the inverse proportion significantly, with the
PCC of 0.3210 and the two-tailed p-value of 1.9542e-19. If
a predator is closer to the prey, it is more likely to catch the
prey and the contribution of that predator should be more
significant. Consequently, we demonstrate that the credit as-
signment of Shapley Q-value is fair.
5.3 Traffic Junction
Environment Settings In this task, cars move along the
predefined routes which intersect on one or more traffic
junctions. At each time step, new cars are added to the envi-
ronment with the probability parrive, and the total number of
cars is limited below Nmax. After a car finishes its mission,
it will be removed from the environment and possibly sam-
pled back to a new route. Each car has a limited vision of
1, which means it can only observe the circumstance within
the 3x3 region surrounding it. No communication between
cars is permitted in our experiment, in contrast to the oth-
ers’ experiments on the same task (Sukhbaatar, szlam, and
Fergus 2016; Das et al. 2018). The action space of each
car is gas and brake, and the global reward function is∑N
i=1 - 0.01ti, where ti is the time steps that car i is contin-
uously active on the road in one mission and N is the total
number of cars. Additionally, if a collision occurs, the global
reward will be reduced by 10. We evaluate the performance
by the success rate (i.e., the episode that no collisions hap-
pen).
Results We compare our method with the baselines on the
easy, medium and hard version of Traffic Junction. The easy
version is constituted of one traffic junction of two one-
way roads on a 7 × 7 grid with Nmax = 5 and parrive = 0.3.
The medium version is constituted of one traffic junction
of two-way roads on a 14 × 14 grid with Nmax = 10 and
parrive = 0.2. The hard version is constituted of four con-
nected traffic junctions of two-way roads on a 18 × 18 grid
with Nmax = 20 and parrive = 0.05. From Tab.2, we can see
that on the easy version, except for IA2C, other algorithms
can get a success rate over 93%, since this scenario is too
easy. On the medium and hard version, SQDDPG outper-
forms the baselines with the success rate of 88.98% on the
medium version and 87.04% on the hard version. Moreover,
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Figure 4: Credit assignment to each predator for a fixed trajectory. The leftmost figure records a trajectory sampled by an expert
policy. The square represents the initial position whereas the circle indicates the final position of each agent. The dots on the
trajectory indicates each agent’s temporary positions. The other figures show the normalized credit assignments generated by
different MARL algorithms according to this trajectory.
IA2C IDDPG COMA MADDPG SQDDPG
coefficient 0.0508 0.0061 0.1274 0.0094 0.3210
two-tailed p-value 1.6419e-1 8.6659e-1 4.6896e-4 7.9623e-1 1.9542e-19
Table 1: The Pearson correlation coefficient between the credit assignment to each predator and the reciprocal of its distance to
the prey. This test is conducted by 1000 randomly selected episode samples.
Difficulty IA2C IDDPG COMA MADDPG SQDDPG
Easy 65.01% 93.08% 93.01% 93.72% 93.26%
Medium 67.51% 84.16% 82.48% 87.92% 88.98%
Hard 60.89% 64.99% 85.33% 84.21% 87.04%
Table 2: The success rate on Traffic Junction, tested with 20, 40, and 60 steps per episode in easy, medium and hard versions
respectively. The results are obtained by running each algorithm after training for 1000 episodes.
the performance of SQDDPG significantly exceeds that of
no-communication algorithms reported as 84.9% and 74.1%
in (Das et al. 2018). We demonstrate that SQDDPG can
solve out the large-scale problems.
5.4 Discussion
In the experimental results, it is surprising that IDDPG
achieves a good performance. The possible reason could be
that a potential game (i.e., a global reward game) can be
solved by the fictitious play (Monderer and Shapley 1996)
and DDPG is analogous to it, finding an optimal determinis-
tic policy by fitting the other agents’ behaviours. However,
the convergence rate is not guaranteed when the number of
agents becomes large, such as the result shown in the hard
version of Traffic Junction. To deal with both of competitive
and cooperative games, MADDPG assigns each agent a cen-
tralised critic to estimate the global reward. Theoretically the
credits assigned to agents are identical, though in experiment
it does not always exhibit this property. The possible reason
could be the bias existing in the Q-values. We can see from
Tab.1 that both of COMA and SQDDPG exhibit the feature
of credit assignment. Nonetheless, SQDDPG performs more
significantly on the fairness. This well validates our motiva-
tion of importing the local reward approach (e.g., Shapley
value) to solve out the credit assignment problems.
6 Conclusion
We introduce the cooperative game theory to extend the ex-
isting global reward game to a broader framework called
extended convex game (ECG). Under this framework, we
propose an algorithm namely Shapley Q-value deep deter-
ministic policy gradient (SQDDPG), leveraging a local re-
ward approach called Shapley Q-value, which is theoreti-
cally guaranteed to find out the optimal solution in an ECG
with the grand coalition (i.e., a global reward game). We
evaluate SQDDPG on three global reward games (i.e., Co-
operative Navigation, Prey-and-Predator and Traffic Junc-
tion) and show the promising performance compared with
the baselines (e.g., MADDPG, COMA, IDDPG and IA2C).
During the experiments, SQDDPG exhibits the fair credit as-
signments and fast convergence rate. In the future work, we
plan to dynamically group the agents at each time step with
some theoretical guarantees and jump out of the restriction
of global reward game.
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Appendix
Algorithm
In this section, we show the pseudo code of Shapley Q-value
deep deterministic policy gradient (SQDDPG) in Algorithm
1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. With the efficient payoff distribution scheme,
for an extended convex game (ECG), one solution in the core
can be certainly found with the grand coalition and the ob-
jective is maxpi vpi({N}), which can lead to the maximal
social welfare, i.e., maxpi vpi({N}) ≥ maxpi vpi(CS ′) for
every coalition structure CS ′ ∈ CSN .
Proof. The proof is as follows.
As we defined before, in an ECG, after allocating coali-
tions each agent will further maximize the cumulative re-
wards of his coalition by the optimal policy. Now, we denote
the optimal value of an arbitrary coalition C′ as v∗(C′) =
maxpiC′ v
piC′ (C′), where piC′ = ×i∈C′pii. Similarly, we can
define the optimal value given an arbitrary coalition struc-
ture CS as v∗(CS) =∑C∈CS v∗(C). If we re-write the value
function defined above, ECG can be reformulated to CG. For
this reason, we can directly use the results in Lemma 1 here
to complete the proof.
First, we aim to show that (i) In an ECG, there exists
an efficient payoff distribution scheme x that v∗({N}) ≥
v∗(CS ′) for any CS ′ ∈ CSN , and ({N}, x) is a solution in
the core.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ({N}, x) is not
in the core, but due to Statement (1) in Lemma 1, there must
exist a coalition structure CS other than {N} satisfies the
result that (CS, xˆ) is in the core. According to Statement (2)
in Lemma 1, since CG is a subclass of characteristic function
games, with an efficient payoff distribution scheme we can
get that
v∗(CS) =
∑
C∈CS
v∗(C) ≥ v∗({N}). (12)
On the other hand, because of the property of ECG, i.e.,
max
piC∪D
vpiC∪D (C ∪ D) ≥ max
piC
vpiC (C) + max
piD
vpiD (D),
∀C,D ⊂ N , C ∩ D = φ,
(13)
we have that
v∗({N}) = max
piN
vpiN ({N})
= max
piN
vpiN (N )
≥ max
piC1
vpiC1 (C1) + max
piC2
vpiC2 (C2)
(∀ C1 ∪ C2 =
⋃
C∈CS
C, C1 ∩ C2 = φ)
≥ ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
(We further expand the terms similarly)
≥
∑
C∈CS
max
piC
vpiC (C)
= v∗(CS) (14)
By Eq.12 and 14, we can get that
v∗({N}) = v∗(CS). (15)
According to the condition of efficient payoff distribution
scheme, we can write:
v∗({N}) =
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
C∈CS
x(C), (16)
v∗(CS) =
∑
C∈CS
v∗(C) =
∑
C∈CS
xˆ(C). (17)
By Eq.15, we can get that∑
C∈CS
x(C) =
∑
C∈CS
xˆ(C). (18)
By Eq.18, it is obvious that we can always find out a pay-
off distribution scheme x = xˆ for the grand coalition {N}.
Since (CS, xˆ) is presumed to be in the core, ({N}, xˆ) must
satisfy the conditions of core. As a result, we derive that
({N}, x) (where x = xˆ) is a solution in the core which con-
tradicts the presumption we made and we show that propo-
sition (i) holds.
Then, we aim to show that (ii) In an ECG, with an efficient
payoff distribution scheme, the objective is maxpi vpi({N}).
The objective of a CG is finding a solution in the core. Ac-
cording to (i), maxCS∈CSN v∗(CS) is equivalent to finding
a solution in the core corresponding to the grand coalition
{N}. For this reason, we can write
max
CS∈CSN
v∗(CS) = v∗({N})
= max
piN
vpiN ({N})
(Since we write pi = piN )
= max
pi
vpi({N}). (19)
Therefore, we prove (ii).
According to (ii), we can conclude that in an ECG,
the objective is maximizing vpi({N}), i.e., the global re-
ward. However, an efficient payoff distribution scheme,
e.g., Shapley value should be a condition, otherwise,
maxpi v
pi({N}) < vˆ({N}), where vˆ({N}) is the theoret-
ically optimal value that can be found.
Experimental Setups
As for the setups of experiments, because different environ-
ments may involve variant complexity and dynamics, we
give different hyperparameters for each task. All of algo-
rithms use MLPs as hidden layers for the policy networks.
All of policy networks only use one hidden layer. About the
critic networks, every algorithm uses MLPs with one hid-
den layer. For each experiment, we keep the learning rate,
entropy regularization coefficient, update frequency, batch
size and the number of hidden units identical on each algo-
rithm, except for the algorithms with the natural gradients
(e.g., COMA and A2C). These algorithms need the special
learning rates to maintain the stability of training. In the
experiments, each agent has its own state in execution for
Algorithm 1 Shapley Q-value deep deterministic policy gradient (SQDDPG)
1: Initialize actor parameters θi, and critic (AMC) parameters ωi for each agent i ∈ N
2: Initialize target actor parameters θ′i, and target critic parameters ω
′
i for each agent i ∈ N
3: Initialize the sample size M for approximating Shapley Q-value
4: Initialize the learning rate τ for updating target network
5: Initialize the discount rate γ
6: for episode = 1 to D do
7: Observe initial state s1 from the environment
8: for t = 1 to T do
9: ui ← µθi(st) +Nt for each agent i . Select action according to the current policy and exploration noise.
10: Execute actions ut = ×i∈Nui and observe the global reward rt and the next state st+1
11: Store (st,ut, rt, st+1) in the replay buffer B
12: Sample a minibatch of G samples (sk,uk, rk, sk+1) from B
13: Get ak = ×i∈Nµθi(sk) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
14: Get aˆk = ×i∈Nµθ′i(sk+1) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
15: for each agent i do . This procedure can be implemented in parallel.
16: Sample M ordered coalitions by C ∼ Pr(C|N\{i})
17: for each sampled coalition Cm do . This procedure can be implemented in parallel.
18: Order each ak by Cm and mask the irrelevant agents’ actions, storing it to amk
19: Order each aˆk by Cm and mask the irrelevant agents’ actions, storing it to aˆmk
20: Order each uk by Cm and mask the irrelevant agents’ actions, storing it to umk
21: Get QΦik (sk, ai;ωi)← 1M
∑M
m=1 Φˆi(sk, a
m
k ;ωi) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
22: Get QΦik (sk, ui;ωi)← 1M
∑M
m=1 Φˆi(sk,u
m
k ;ωi) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
23: Get QΦik (sk, aˆi;ω
′
i)← 1M
∑M
m=1 Φˆi(sk, aˆ
m
k ;ω
′
i) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
24: Update θi by deterministic policy gradient according to Eq.10:
∇θiJ(θi) =
1
G
G∑
k=1
∇θiµθi(sk)∇aiQΦik (sk, ai;ωi)|ai=µθi (sk)
25: Set yk = rk + γ
∑
i∈N Q
Φi
k (sk, aˆi;ω
′
i) for each sample (sk,uk, rk, sk+1)
26: Update ωi for each agent i by minimizing the optimization problem according to Eq.11:
min
ωi
1
G
G∑
k=1
1
2
( yk −
∑
i∈N
QΦik (sk, ui;ωi) )
2
27: Update target network parameters for each agent i:
θ′i ← τθi + (1− τ)θ′i
ω′i ← τωi + (1− τ)ω′i
the policy. In training, the agents with the centralised crit-
ics share the states while those with the decentralised critics
only observe its own state. The rest details of experimental
setups are introduced as below. All of models are trained by
Adam Optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) with default hyper-
parameters (except for the learning rate).
Additional Details of Cooperative Navigation The spe-
cific hyperparameters of each algorithm used in Cooperative
Navigation are shown as Tab.3.
Additional Details of Prey-and-Predator The specific
hyperparameters of each algorithm used in Prey-and-
Predator are shown as Tab.4. Also, we provide more evi-
dences to support the conclusion that the credit assignment
of SQDDPG is inversely proportional to the distance to the
prey, shown as Fig.5.
Additional Details of Traffic Junction To give the reader
an intuitive understanding of the environment, we list the
experimental settings of different difficulty levels as Tab.5
shows and give the illustrations shown as Fig.7. The specific
hyperparameters of each algorithm used in Traffic Junction
are shown as Tab.6. To exhibit the training procedure in more
details, we also display the figures of mean rewards, e.g.,
Fig.6a∼6c and the figures of success rate, e.g., Fig.6d∼6f.
Non-cooperative Game Theory
To clarify why we are interested in the framework of co-
operative game theory, let us begin with non-cooperative
game theory. Non-cooperative game theory aims to solve
Hyperparameters # Description
hidden units 32 The number of hidden units for both policy and critic network
training episodes 5000 The number of training episodes
episode length 200 Maximum time steps per episode
discount factor 0.9 The importance of future rewards
update frequency for behaviour network 100 Behaviour network updates every # steps
learning rate for policy network 1e-4 Policy network learning rate
learning rate for policy network(COMA) 1e-2 Policy network learning rate for COMA
learning rate for policy network(IA2C) 1e-6 Policy network learning rate for IA2C
learning rate for critic network 1e-3 Critic network learning rate
learning rate for critic network(COMA) 1e-4 Critic network learning rate for COMA
learning rate for critic network(IA2C) 1e-5 Critic network learning rate for IA2C
update frequency for target network 200 Target network updates every # steps
target update rate 0.1 Target network update rate
entropy regularization coefficient 1e-2 Weight or regularization for exploration
batch size 32 The number of transitions for each update
Table 3: Table of hyperparameters for Cooperative Navigation.
Hyperparameters # Description
hidden units 128 The number of hidden units for both policy and critic network
training episodes 5000 The number of training episodes
episode length 200 Maximum time steps per episode
discount factor 0.99 The importance of future rewards
update frequency for behaviour network 100 Behaviour network updates every # steps
learning rate for policy network 1e-4 Policy network learning rate
learning rate for policy network(COMA/IA2C) 1e-3 Policy network learning rate for COMA and IA2C
learning rate for critic network 5e-4 Critic network learning rate
learning rate for critic network(COMA/IA2C) 1e-4 Critic network learning rate for COMA and IA2C
update frequency for target network 200 Target network updates every # steps
target update rate 0.1 Target network update rate
entropy regularization coefficient 1e-3 Weight or regularization for exploration
batch size 128 The number of transitions for each update
Table 4: Table of hyperparameters for Prey-and-Predator.
Difficulty parrive Nmax Entry-Points # Routes # Two-way Junctions # Dimension
Easy 0.3 5 2 1 F 1 7x7
Medium 0.2 10 4 3 T 1 14x14
Hard 0.05 20 8 7 T 4 18x18
Table 5: The settings of Traffic Junction for different difficulty levels. parrive means the probability to add an available car into
the environment. Nmax means the existing number of the cars. Entry-Points # means the number of possible entry points for
each car. Routes # means the number of possible routes starting from every entry point.
out the problem in which agents are selfish and intelligent
(Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). In other words, each agent
merely considers maximizing his own rewards to approach
a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, non-cooperative game
theory is intuitively not suitable for modelling cooperative
scenarios. To model the cooperative scenarios, one possi-
ble way is through constructing a global reward function
(which is unnecessary to be convex), e.g., Potential (Mon-
derer and Shapley 1996) that replaces each individual re-
ward function. As a result, each agent’s objective is forced
to be identical, i.e., fully cooperative game. Even if each
agent is still keen on maximizing his own rewards, the co-
ordination can be formed. Nonetheless, this approach has
its own limitations. Firstly, it lacks the clear explanations
for credit assignments. Secondly, assigning credits to each
agent equally may cause the slow learning rate (Balch 1997;
Balch 1999). Thirdly, this framework is difficult to be ex-
tended to solve out more complex problems such as the
competition among different coalitions. However, cooper-
ative game theory (with transferable utility), concentrating
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Figure 5: Credit assignment to each predator for a fixed trajectory. The leftmost figure records a trajectory sampled by an expert
policy. The square represents the initial position whereas the circle indicates the final position of each agent. The dots on the
trajectory indicates each agent’s temporary positions. The other figures show the normalized credit assignments generated by
different MARL algorithms according to this trajectory.
Hyperparameters Easy Meidum Hard Description
hidden units 128 128 128 The number of hidden units for both policy and critic network
training episodes 2000 5000 2000 The number of training episodes
episode length 50 50 100 Maximum time steps per episode
discount factor 0.99 0.99 0.99 The importance of future rewards
update frequency for behaviour network 25 25 25 Behaviour network updates every # steps
learning rate for policy network 1e-4 1e-4 1e-4 Policy network learning rate
learning rate for critic network 1e-3 1e-3 1e-3 Critic network learning rate
update frequency for target network 50 50 50 Target network updates every # steps
target update rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 Target network update rate
entropy regularization coefficient 1e-4 1e-4 1e-4 Weight or regularization for exploration
batch size 64 32 32 The number of transitions for each update
Table 6: Table of hyperparameters for Traffic Junction.
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(a) Mean reward per episode during training
in Traffic Junction on easy version.
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(b) Mean reward per episode during training
in Traffic Junction on medium version.
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(c) Mean reward per episode during training
in Traffic Junction on high version.
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(d) Success rate per episode during training
in Traffic Junction on easy version.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Training Episode
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e 
Pe
r E
pi
so
de
SQDDPG
IA2C
IDDPG
COMA
MADDPG
(e) Success rate per episode during training
in Traffic Junction on medium version.
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(f) Success rate per episode during training in
Traffic Junction on hard version.
Figure 6: Mean reward and success rate per episode during training in Traffic Junction Environment on all difficulty levels.
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Figure 7: Visualizations of traffic junction environment. The black points represent the available entry points. The orange arrows
represent the available routes at each entry point. The green lines separate the two-way roads.
on credit assignment and dividing coalitions (or groups)
(Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge 2011) can solve out
these problems. This is the reason why we introduce and in-
vestigate cooperative game theory.
Limitations of Extended Convex Game
In this paper, we propose a framework built on cooperative
game theory called extended convex game (ECG). Although
ECG has extended the framework of global reward game de-
fined upon non-cooperative game theory to a broader scope,
there exist some limitations to this model. Firstly, we have
to assume that there is an oracle scheduling the coalition
initially, however, this oracle is difficult to realize in im-
plementation. Even if the oracle can be implemented, this
model still cannot solve out some problems with random
perturbations. This is due to the fact that the oracle has as-
signed each agent to a coalition with the environment that
it knows. Obviously, the perturbation exceeds its knowl-
edge. To deal with this problem, we may investigate how
to enable the coalition construction dynamically in the fu-
ture work. The intuitive idea is enabling the oracle to learn
a policy for scheduling the coalition from the history infor-
mation. At each step, it uses the learned policy to divide the
coalitions. Then, each agent act within the coalition to max-
imize the social value of the coalition. This process can be
repeated infinitely. Nonetheless, the promising convergence
under the cooperative game theoretical framework for this
complicated process could be a challenge.
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